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Abstract 
Subjects in 3 experiments chose their preferred bet from pairs of 
bets, and later bid for each bet separately. In each pair, one bet had 
a higher probability of winnirig.(P bet); the other offered more to win 
(S bet). Bidding method (selling vs. buying) and payoff method (real-
play vs. hourly wage) were varied. Results showed that when the P bet 
was chosen, the$ bet o~en received a higher bid. These inconsistencies 
violate every risky decision model, but can be understood via information-
processing considerations. In bidding, S starts with amount to win and 
adjusts it downward to account for other attributes of the bet. In 
choosing, there is no natural starting point. Thus amount to win dominates , 
bids but not choices. One need not call this behavior irrational, but 
it casts doubt on the descriptive validity of expected utility models 
of risky decision making. 
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<REVERSALS OF PREFERENCE BETWEEN 
.BIDS AND CHOICES IN GAMBLING DECISIONs1 
Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic2 
Oregon Research Institute, Eugene 
,Utility theory, in one form or another, has provided the guiding 
principle for prescribing and describing gambling decisions since the 
eighteenth century. The expected utility principle asserts that, given 
a choice a,mong gambles, the decision maker will select the one with the 
highest expected utility. 
There are a number of- ways other than choosing by which an individual 
can express his opinions about the utilities of various gambles •. Among 
these are ratings of attractiveness,_bids to buy, and bids to sell: 
1. Ratings of attractiveness: On an arbitrary scale,~ assigns an 
attractiveness value to each of a set of bets. For any pair, it is 
assumed that he prefers the one to which he gives the highest rating. 
2. Bids to buy (B-bids): E owns a set of bets. For each bet, ~ 
indicates the·maximum amount of money he would pay in order to be able 
.to play the bet. (See Coombs, BezembiJder, & Goode, 1967; Lichtenstein, 
I 
· 1965). For any pair of bets, it is as~umed that he prefers the one for 
which he bids the most money. 
3. Bids to sell ( S-bids): S owns
1 
a set of bets. For each bet, ~ 
indicates the minimum amount for which he would sell the right to play 
the bet. (See Becker, DeGroot & MarscHak, 1964; Coombs et al., 1967;. 
Tversky, 1967). For any pair it is asJumed that he prefers the bet for 
which he demands the most money •. 
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Since utility t~eory assumes that these different responses are all 
determined by the same underlying values, it predicts that Ss who are 
2 
asked to choose one of two bets will choose the ·on'e for which they would 
make the higher bid, or to which they rould give the higher rating. 
In contrast, the view of the pres~nt authors is that such decisions 
I 
do not rely solely on expected utiliti~s. Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) 
I 
have demonstrated that a gambie is a mrlti-dimensional stimulus whose 
I 
various attributes have differential effects on individual decision-
' . 
I 
I 
making behavior. In particular, they presented evidence ~hat choices and 
attractiveness ra~ings are determined primarily by a gamble's probabili~ 
ties, while bids are most influenced by the amount to be won or lost. 
Specifically, when Ss found a bet attractive, their bids correlated pre-
dominantly with the amount to win; and when they disliked a bet, the 
amount to lose was the primary determiner. It was argued that these 
differences between ratings and choices on the one hand and bids on the 
other demonstrated the influence of information-processing considerations 
upon the method by which a gamble is judged. In the bidding task; Ss had 
to evaluate a gamble in monetary units; this requirement apparently led 
them to attend more to payoffs when bidding than they did when making 
choices or ratings. 
The notion that the information describing a gamble is processed 
differently for bids than for choices s_uggested that it might be possible 
to cons.truct a pair of gambles such that .§_ would choose one of them but 
bid more·for the other. For example, consider· the pair consisting of 
Bet P (,99 to win $4 and .01 to lose $1) and Bet$ (.33 to win $16 and 
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.67 to lose $2). Bet P has a much better probability of winning but Bet 
$ offers more to win. If choices tend to be determined by probabilities, 
while bids are most influenced by payoffs, one might expect that .§_s 
wollld choose Bet P over Bet$, but bid more for Bet$. If such a reversal 
of orderings were to occur, it would provide dramatic confirmation of the 
notion that bidding and choice involve two _quite different processes--
processes that involve more than just the underlying utilities of the 
gambles. The following three experiments tested this hypothesis,. 
For all three experiments; the general paradigm was· first to present 
S with a number of pairs of bets. All of the bets had positive expected 
value and were viewed by Ss as bets they would like to play. Every pair 
was composed of two bets with the same (or nearly the same) expected 
value: a "P bet," i.e., a bet v1ith a high probability of winning a 
modest amount and a low probability of losing an even more modest amount 0 
and a ''$ bet," i.e. , a bet with a modest probability of winning a large 
· amount and a large probability of losing a modest amount. For each pair 
S indicated which bet he would prefer to play. After Shad made all his 
choices, he then made a bid for each of the bets, which this time were 
presented one at a time. 
·Experiment I 
Experiment I was a group study comparing choices with s~bids. The 
Ss were 173 male undergraduates who were paid for participating; there 
was no actual gambling. The stimuli were 13 two-outcome bets, 6 bets 
with excellent odds (the P bets), and 7 bets with large winning payoffs 
' ( the $ bets), · All bets had positive expected values, ranging from $1. 40 
Lichtenstein 4 
-to $4, 45. First these bets were combined into 12 pairs,· each of which 
had one P bet and one$ bet; no bet occurred more than twice. The Ss 
were asked to pick, for each pair, the bet they wo1:1ld prefer to play. 
After each choice, ~s indicated how strongly they preferred their chosen 
bet by marking one of four lines on their answer sheet; the first line 
was labeled "slight" preference and the fourth was labeled "very strong" 
preference. The instructions suggested that the two intermediate lines 
C 
might be labeled "moderate" and_"strong." After about one hour of 
intervening work, Ss then made bidding responses to 19 singly presented 
bets. The first 6 bets were intended as practice bets and -differed from 
those used in the paired comparisons. The responses to these bets were 
not analyzed. The next 13 bets were the same as those used earlier. I.n 
the bidding fnstructions; ~ was told he owned a ticket to play the bet-
and was asked to name a minimum selling price for the ticket such that he 
would be indifferent to playing-the bet or receiving the selling price. 
For both the bidding and choice tasks, Ss knew their decisions were "just 
imagine." 
Since the 12 pairs contained several repetitions of single bets, 
only the results of a subset of 6 pairs of bets, which contained no bets 
in common, are presented here; these bets are shown in Table 1. The 
results for the other 6 pairs were virtually identical to these. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Results. The first column of Figure 1 shows the results of Experi-
ment 1. The top histogram indicates that most subjects varied their 
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choices across bets, choosing the P bet over the$ bet about half the 
time. This does not mean, however, that the Ss felt indifferent about 
their choices. The mean strength of preference, when coded 1 ("slight"), 
2, 3, oi' 4 ("very strong"), was 2.94, with a standard deviation of .95. 
Most of the._§_s (65%) never used the "slight" preference rating. 
The second histogram in the first column of Figure 1 shows that ~s 
were far more consistent in their bids: 70% of the Ss never bid more 
for the P bet than for the$ bet with which it had previously bee~ paired. 
The proportion of times that the bid for the$ bet exceeded the bid 
for the P bet, given that the P bet had been chosen from the pair, is 
called the proportion of conditional predicted reversals in Figure 1. 
Of the 173 _§_s, 127 (73%) always made this reversal: for every pair in 
which the P bet was chosen, the$ bet later received a higher bid. 
The histogram labeled conditional unpredicted reversals shows the 
proportion of times·in which the bid for the P bet exceeded the bid for 
the$ bet, given that the$ bet had been previously chosen. This latter 
behavior was not predicted by the authors, and is hard to rationalize 
under any. theory of decision making. It might best be thought of as a 
result of carelessness or changes in S's strategy during the experiment. 
Unpredicted reversals were rare in Experiment I; 144 ~s (83%) never 
made them. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
' l 
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The mean strength of preferencE? rating was as high when Ss made 
reversals as it was when ~s were consistent, as shown in Table 2. This 
.finding suggests that reversals could not be attributed to indifference 
in the choice task. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
6 
It is clear that when S-bids are compared with choices, reversals 
occur as predicted. Would the effect also hold for comparisons of choices 
with B-bids? There are certain considerations suggesting that the 
reversal effect might be diminished, since the effect seems to be largely 
attributable to a tendency to overbid for$ bets but not for P bets. For 
example, with the P bet: .99 to. win $4 ·and .01 to lose $1, it is hard to 
imagine a bid much beyond the expected value of $3.95; while with the$ . 
bet: .33 to win $16 and .67 to lose $2, bids greatly exceeding the 
expected value of $3.94 are common. Since Ss ask to be paid more when 
selling a bet than they pay to play when buying, the S-bid method leads 
to higher bids than the B-bid method (Coombs et al., 1967; Slovic f., 
Lichtenstein, 1968). Therefore, S-bidding should act to enhance the 
amount of differential overbidding and thereby lead to more reversals 
than B-bidding. 
Experiment II 
The goals of Exp. II were to test the generality of the reversal 
phenomenon by using the B-bid technique, as well as· to study the rela-
tionships between various attributes of the bets and the reversal 
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phenomenon, by using ·a larger and more varied set of stimuli. 
Method. The Ss were 74 college students run in 4 groups. No bets 
were actually played; ~s were paid by the hour. -The stimuli were 49 
pairs_ of bets following 11 practice pairs. Contained in these pairs were 
88 different single bets. These 88 bets, following 10 practice ,bets, 
constituted the bidding stimuli., Results from the practice stimuli were 
exclude.d from the analyses. The bets in each pair were equated in 
expected value. Each P bet had a winning probability from 8/12 to 11/12; 
the probability of winning for the$ bet ranged from 1/12 to 5/12. The 
$ bet always had a larger amount to win than the P bet. With few 
exceptions, the win exceeded the loss in a given bet. 
The bets were expressed in dollars and·cents; the winning amount 
ranged from 10¢ to $10; the losing amount from 10¢ to $3.70; the expected 
value ranged from +10¢ to +$3. ·Atypical bet pair looked like this: 
(P bet) 10/12 to win $1.00 and 
($ bet) 
2/12 to lose$ .20 
3/12 to win $9.00 and 
9/12 to lose $2.00 
The bets were chosen in an attempt to represent a variety of P bets 
< 
and $ bets, Thus, the winning am·ount in the $ bet always exceeded the 
winning amount in the P bet, but the ratio of the former to the latter, 
ranged from 1,3 to 100. The difference between the amount to lose in 
the$ bet and the amount to lose in the P bet varied from -$3.00 to 
+$2.80. 
The Ss were first briefly instructed in the choice task. ~hey were 
! . 
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asked to choose, from each pair, which bet they would prefer to play. 
After choosing, the ~s turned to the bidding task. Instructions for the 
buying method of bidding emphasized " ••• the highest price you would pay 
to play it •••• Ask yourself each time, 'Is that the most money I would· 
pay to play that bet?'" 
Results. Comparison of the second column with the first column of 
Figure 1 shows there were fewer predicted reversals, and more unpredicted 
reversals, for B-bids (Exp. II) than for S-bids (Exp. I). As expected, 
the B~bids in Exp. II were lower, relative to the expected values of the 
bets, than the S-bids in Exp. I. In Exp. I, bids for the P bets were, on 
the average, 7¢ lower than expected value, while bids for the$ bets were 
$3. 56 higher than expected value. In Exp. II the average bid for th·e P 
I 
bets was 44¢ below average expected value, while the average bid for the 
$ bets was 4¢ below average expected value. These results indicate that 
the B-bid technique serves to dampen the tendency towards gross over-
bidding for$ bets, and hence to reduce the rate of predicted reversals. 
In addition, since bids for$ bets are closer in range to bids for P bets 
in Exp. II, even fairly small fluctuations in bidding could more easily 
.produce an increase in the occurrence of unpredicted reversals, as 
observed. Nevertheless, 46 of the 66 Ss had a higher rate of conditional 
predicted reversals than conditional unpredicted reversals. 
The 49 pairs of bets used in this experiment were constrained by the 
requirements that all P bets had high probability of winning a modest 
amount, while all$ bets had low to moderate probability of winning a 
large amount. Nevertheless, there were differences in the degree to 
·--
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which individual pairs of these bets elicited predicted reversals. 
Despite the constraints there was sufficient variability within some 
9 
of the characteristics of the bets to permit analysis of their relation-
ship to ~s' bids and choices. This analysis indicated that the difference 
between the amount to lose in the$ bet and the amount to lose in the P 
bet correlated .82 across the 49 bet pairs with the number of Ss who 
chose the P bet. Thus, when the amount to lose in the$ bet was larger 
than the amount to lose in the P bet, ~s chose the P bet 73% of the time. 
But when the reverse was true, the P bet was chosen only 34% of the time. 
This loss variable had no differential effect upon bids. 
Variations in amount to win, on the other hand, affected bids but 
not choices. The amount to win in the$ bet was always larger than the 
amount to win in the P bet, but the ratio of the two winning amounts 
varied. This win ratio correlated .55 across the 49 bet pairs with the 
number of Ss who bid more for th€$ bet than for its previously paired 
P bet. The win ratio did not correlate (r = -.03) with the number of 
Ss who chose the P bet. 
These results, that variations in amount to lose affected cho_ices 
but not bids, while variations in amount to win.affected bids but not 
choices, are further evidence that different modes of information 
processing are used in bidding and choosing. 
The probabilities of winning across the 49 bet pairs in Exp. II had 
very narrow ranges (8/12 to 11/12 in the P bets, 1/12 to 5/12 in the·$ 
bets) and had no differential effects on th_e frequency of reversals. 
The probability of observing a predicted reversal increases both 
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when the probability of~ choosing the p bet increases and when the 
probability of~ bidding more for the$ bet increases. This, together 
with the correlational information presented above, implies that the 
ideal bet pair for observing reversals would have a larger$ bet loss 
than a P bet loss (facilitat.1ng.choice of th~ P bet), and a large$ bet 
win relative to the P bet win (facilitating a larger bid for the$ bet). 
In fact, in this experiment, the bet pair which had the most predicted 
reversals (40 of 66 Ss reversed) had just these characteristics: 
P bet 9/12 to win $1.10 and 
3/12 to lose$ .10 
$ bet 3/12 to win $9.20 and 
9/12 to lose $2.00 
Experiment III 
The purpose of Exp. III was to test whether the predicted reversals 
would occur under conditions designed to maximize motivation and minimize 
indifference and carelessness. Lengthy and careful instructions were 
individually administered to 14 male undergraduates. The bets were 
actually played, and Ss were paid their winnings. 
The stimuli were the 12 bets, 6 P bets and 6 $ bets, shown in Table 
3. The probabilities were expressed in 36ths, so that a roulette wheel 
Insert Table 3 about here 
could be used to play the bets~ The amounts to win and lose were shown 
as points (ranging from 50 to 4000), and a conversion to money was 
~-
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.established such that the minimum win was 80¢ (even for.Ss who had a net 
loss of points), while .the maximum win was $8.00. The concept of conver-
. ting points· to money, and the minimum and maximum win, were explained to. 
Ss at the beginning of the experiment. However, the actual conversion 
curve was not revealed until the experiment was over. 
Each_§_ was run individually. After six practice pairs; S chose his 
preferred bet from each of the six critical pairs three consecutive times, 
with a different order of presentation and top-bottom alignment each time. 
The~ kept a record of S's choices. After_§_ had responded to each pair 
·twice, this fact was pointed out to him. The E told S that he would see 
these same six pairs one last time, that E would remind S of which bet 
he had preferred on each of the first two times and ask_§_ for his final, 
binding decision. The E emphasized that his·interest was in obtaining 
S's careful and considered judgments and that S should feel free to change 
his decision if, by so doing, he would reflect his true feelings of 
preference for one bet over the other. Then, as_§_ looked at each pair, 
E would report either "The first two times, you said you would.prefer to 
play Bet A (Bet B); do you still prefer that bet? 11 or "You chose·Bet A 
once and Bet B once. Which bet do you really want to play?" It was 
emphasized that this final choice would determine which bet S would ac-
tually play. 
Following this final round of choices,_§_ was instructed in making 
S-bids. This explanation was far more complex than that used in Exp. I, 
and. included all the persuasions discussed by Becker, et al. (1964) •. 
These instructions were designed to convince S that it was in his best 
. ·- ... .,,.... 
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interest to bid for a bet exactly what that bet was worth to him. The S 
was told that!:_ would choose a counter-offer against which to compare .§_'s 
price by spinning, the roulette wheel and entering the number so obtained 
in a conversion table specially designed for each bet. The conversion 
table was a· list of the 36 roulette numbers.with a counter-offer·asso-
ciated with each number. If the counter-offer• was equal to, or greater 
than, the .§_'s previously stated bid,!:_ would buy the bet from.§_, paying 
S the amount of the counter-offer. · If the counter-offer was smaller than 
.§_'s price, no sale would be made and.§_ would play the bet. The counter-
offer tables were constructed on the basis of previous bids for similar 
bets, with a range chosen to include most of the anticipated bids. The 
values of the counter-offers can influence the expected value of the 
game as a whole, but they dci not affect the optimal response strategy, 
a fact which was pointed out to .§_s. 
Further discussion of the technique emphasized two points: (a) The 
strategy that.§_ should follow.in order to maximize his gain from the game 
was always to name as his price exactly what he thought the bet was worth 
to him. (b) A good test of whether .§_'s price was right for him was to 
ask himself whether he would rather play the bet or get that price by 
selling it. The price was right when.§_ was indifferent between these 
\ 
two events. The I then presented several (up to 12) practice trials. 
These practice trials included the complete routine: S stated his selling 
price, E obtained a counter-offer, and the bet was either.sold or played. 
The 12 critical bets were then present.ed three times successively. 
However, the playing of the .critical bets (including selection of a counter-
Lichtenstein 13. 
offer) was deferred until..§_ had stated his price for all bets. On the 
third presentation, while..§_ was studying a particular.bet, but before..§_ 
had stated his price, E told..§_ what his price had been for the first two 
times, and urged him now to reconsider and name the final, binding price 
which would later be used in playing the game. 
A~er these decisions,..§_ played the game. First, he played his 
preferred bet for.each of the six pairs of bets. Then the bids were 
played, starting with the selection by E of a counter-offer, and ending 
with either sale or play of the bet for all 12 bets. The..§_ kept track of 
his own ·winnings or losses of points, which were, at the end, converted 
to money. 
Results. All data analyses were based only on the third, final 
choices and bids Ss made. Results from these carefully trained and 
financially motivated Ss give further credence to the reversal phenomenon. 
As shown in column 3 of Figure .1, six Ss always made conditional predicted 
reversals and five Ss sometimes made them. Unpredicted reversals were 
rare. 
Is it possible that the reversals in all three experiments resulted 
solely from the unreliability of Ss' responses? This hypothesis can be 
examined by assuming that the probability that..§_ truly prefers the P bet 
in the choice task is equal to the probability that he truly values the 
P bet more in the bidding task. Call this single parameter p, and let 
,p_' = 1 ~ E.· Suppose further that, because of unreliability of response, 
..§_ will report the opposite of his true preference with a probability of 
r (r' = l - r) in the choice task and will reverse the true order of his 
· ... -·· 
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bids with a probability of s (!!.._' = 1 - s) in the bidding task. 
Under this "null model,"~ will choose the P bet while bidding more 
for the$ bet if he truly prefers the P bet and responds with his true 
preference in the choice task but responds with error in the bidding task, 
or if he truly prefers the$ bet and responds with error in the.choice 
task but truly in the bidding task. The probability of observing this 
.response is thus: · E' !!... + p 'E!!...' • The probabilities of all possible 
responses, constructed in similar fashion, are shown in Table 4. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
These expected probabilities can be compared with the proportions 
actually obtained. For each-experiment, three of these proportions are 
independent and yield three equations in the three unknowns; E_; E. and!!.._; 
these equations may be solved for.E__. In general, if the actual cell 
. proportions are a, b, c_, and d as shown in Table 4, solving for E. yields 
the equation: 
ad be 
'EE.' = ---------
(b + c) - (a+ d) 
For the three experiments here reported, the obtained values for 
pp' were .295, .315 and .270 respectively. All of these yield only 
imaginary solutions for E.· However, they are all close to the maximum 
possible real value for EE.', .25, which would imply that E. = .5. When 
E. = .5 is substituted into the expressions in Table 4, then regardless 
of the rates of unreliability, E. and!!.._, the following conditions must 
.. -~ 
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hold: 
1. All marginals must ·be equal to .5. 
2. Cell a must equal cell d. 
3~ Cell b must equal cell c. 
15 
These conditions are clearly not met in the present data, shown in 
Table 4. Since the "null model'' can in no way account for the data, it 
is reasonable to r~ject the notion that unreliability of response is the 
sole determiner of the reversal effect. 
Post~experimental interviews. The Ss in Exp. III who gave predicted 
reversals were interviewed at the end of the experiment in an effort to per-
suade them to change their responses. The inconsistency of the responses 
•were explained to.§_, If S was initially unw.1.lling to change any responses, 
E's interview comments became more and more directive. If pointing out 
that .§_'s pattern of responses could be called inconsistent and irrational 
did not persuade.§_,~ explained to.§_ a money-pump game by means of which 
E could systematically and continuously get.§_ to give~ points without 
3 
ever playing the bets. This was intended to illustrate to S the con-
sequences of his responses. After S understood the nature of the money-
. pump game, he was again urged to resolve the reversal. 
Eleven of the 14 Ss were intervieweq. Of these, six Ss changed one 
or more responses after only a little persuasion, three changed only after 
.the money-pump game was presented to them, and two .§_s refused to change 
their responses at all, insisting throughout the interview that their 
. 4 
original responses did reflect their true feelings about the bets. 
Comments by Ss supported the authors' contention that Ss process 
. . ~ 
·, 
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the bet information differently in the two tasks. Some Ss showed this 
indirectly, by mentioning only the probabilities when _discussing choices, 
while focusing on the amount to win and entirely disregarding the amount 
to lose when discussing bids. 
Other ~s explicitly stat"ed they were using different processing 
methods in choosing and bidding. -For example, Subject L. H. tried to 
justify his bid for.the$ bet of pair 5 by noting that his bid was less 
than half the amount to win. But you see that you have less than half a 
chance to win this. · Much less; in fact. "7 against 29 .•• I'm afraid I 
wasn't thinking of the 7 to 29 [the winning odds]. I was thinking of it 
in terms of -relative point value ••. In other words, I looked at the 29 and 
the 7 [when I was choosing] but as forbidding I was looking at the·rela-
tive point value, which gave me two different perspectives. on the problem." 
Subject L. F. said, "I don't arrive at the evaluation ••• quite the 
same way that I arrive at the preferable bet. And there's some incon-
sistency there. Now, whether in a particular case this leads to an in-
consistency maybe's not too important. It's·just that they're two different 
models ••• ! imagine that shows that the models aren't really accurate, 
but in terms of just betting, they're sound enough. I wouldn't change 
them." 
Subject M. K. said, "You see, the difference was, that when I had 
to pick between [the P bet] and [the$ bet] I picked the bet which was 
more sure to produce some points for me. When I was faced with [the$ 
bet alone], my assessment of what it was worth to me, you know, changed 
because it wasn't being compared with something." 
·~····· 
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Discussion 
In three experiments, Ss frequently chose one bet from a pair of bets 
and subsequently bid more for the bet they did not· choose. The frequency 
of such reversals varied somewhat as experimental conditions changed, 
but was.always far greater than could be explained by. unreliability 
alone. 
These reversals clearly ~onstitute inconsistent behavior, and 
violate every existing theory of decision making. For example, Subjec-
tively Expected Utility Theory (Edwards, 1955) postulates both a subjec-
tive probability function and a subjective worth function, but does not 
allow either function to change its shape as the response mode changes. 
Bids and choices should both be predictable from the same functions; 
reversals are therefore impossible under the model. 5 
The present results imply that attempts to infer subjective proba-
bilities and utility functions-from bids or choices should be regarded 
with suspicion. Since these subjective factors are not the sole deter-
miners of decisions, inferences about them are likely to vary from one 
response mode to the next, because of changes in the decision processes 
used by Ss. 
What are the different decision processes that underly bids and 
choices? The mechanisms determining choices are not clear, but it must 
be kept in mind that in paired comparisons each attribute of one bet 
can be directly.compared with the same attribute of the other bet. There 
is no natural starting point, and~ may be using any number of strategies 
to determine his choice. Tversky (1969) has given s.everal examples of 
\ 
·• 
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such strategies. 
In contrast, bidding techniques provide an obvious starting point: 
the amount to win. Evidence from the present experiments, as well as 
' 
·from the previous study by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968), indicates 
that the S who is preparing a bidding response to a bet he sees as 
favorable starts with the amount to win and adjusts it downwards to take 
into account the o_ther attributes of the bet. The amount to win trans-
lates directly into an amount to bid. However, the probabilities:of 
winning and losing, presented in probability units, are more difficult 
to translate into monetary units. ·. In trying to adjust his bid to take 
into account this more complex information,~ is not very precise. Some 
~s simply subtract a constant from the amount to win. Others multiply 
the amount to win by the probability of winning, entirely disregarding 
the amount to lose. All such schemes produce bids that are highly 
correlated with amount to win but poorly reflect the variations in proba-
bilities and amount to lose. 
The P bets of the present study offered such. high probabilities of 
winning that their modest winning amounts needed to be adjusted downward 
only slightly to take the other factors into account when bidding. In 
contrast, the$ bets offered only a modest chance to win a large amount 
of money. Thus Ss should have made a sizable downward adjustment of the 
amount to win when bidding for these bets. Their failure to do so led 
. 
them to bid more for the$ bet than for the corresponding P bet. This, 
in turn, led to bids which often did not match their choices. Predicted. 
reversals are thus seen.as a consequence of the differing evaluation 
'-:::--=-=:.=:::.:::;:.,:::_:;:._=-----=..:::::...:-:::.:::_ =-:::-.::::.::::..::::..::::..~=-::::...=....::::....;::;~.:::::======================,::====··=--=--=·-=··-=··=·=·=-·=· ·=· =··=-=·===-==--~~_"=J 
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techniques used in the two tasks. 
Is the behavior of Ss who exhibit reversals truly irrational? Tversky 
(1969) posed a similar question about .§_sin whom he had induced systematic 
intransitivities~ and for the following reasons, answered it in the 
negative. He noted that it is impossible to· reach any definite conclusion 
concerning human rationality in the absence of a detailed analysis of the 
cost of the errors. induced by the strategies.§_ follows as compared with 
the cost to.§_ of evaluating alternative strategies. The approximations 
Ss follow in order to simplify the difficult task of bidding might prove 
to be rather efficient, in the sense that they reduce cognitive effort 
and lead to outcomes not too different from the results of optimal 
·strategies. In using such approximations, the decision maker assumes 
that the world, unlike the present experiments, is··~ designed to take 
. advantage of his approximation methods. 
In sum, this study speaks to the importance of i_nformation-processing 
considerations too often neglected by decision theorists. The reversal 
phenomenon is of interest, not because it is irrational, but because 
of the insights it reveals about the nature of human judgment and 
decision making. 
j 
• 
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Footnotes 
1This work was sponsored by the Personnel and Training Research 
Programs, Psychological Sciences Division, _Office of Naval Research, 
21 
.under Contract No. N00014..:.68-C-0431, Contract Authority No. NR 153-311. 
We are grateful to Peter Christenson, who was the~ in Exps. II and 
III, and to Leonard Rorer, Lewis Goldberg and Robyn Dawes for their 
helpful suggestions. 
2 Requests for reprints should be sent to Sarah Lichtenstein, Oregon 
Research Institute, Box 3196, Eugerie, Oregon 97403. 
3 Paraphrased: Suppose I own both bets and you own some points. 
You have said that the$ bet is worth X points to you. Are you willing 
then to buy the$ bet from .me for X points? OK, now you own the$ bet and. 
I have X of your points. But you said you really would rather play the P 
bet than the$ bet.· So would you like to trade me the$ bet for the P 
bet which you like better? OK, now are you willing to sell me the P bet 
for Y points, which is what you told me it is worth? OK, now I have both 
bets back again and also I now have (X - Y) of your points. We are ready 
to repeat the game by my selling yo~ the$ bet again for X points. 
4An edited transcript of one of these Ss is available from the 
authors. 
5This statement is not strictly true for B-bids. When S offers a 
·B-bid for the bet, the utility of this bid cannot be directly equated to 
the expected utility of the bet. Rather, when a bid of bis given to a 
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bet with outcomes X and Y, the utilities of.the quantities (X - .b) and 
(Y - b) are relevant. In a choice situation, however,. the utilities of 
X arid y are relevant. Thus reversals could occur with suitably chosen 
utility curves (Raiffa, 1968, PP• 89-91). · Utility theory does not, 
' 
however, help one understand why there were more predicted reversals in 
--
the present study with S-bids (whe-re rever::,als are normatively impossible) 
than with B-bids (where reversals are normatively permitted). 
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Table 1 
Bets Used in Experiment I 
--···· - - -· 
- -
Pair P bet I Expected $ bet Expected Value Value 
-
1 .99 Win $4.00 $3.95 .33 Win $16.00 $3.94 
.01 Lose 1. 00 I .67 Lose 2.00 
2 .95 Win $2.50 $2.34 .40 Win $ 8.50 $2~50 
.05 Lose .75 .60 Lose 1. 50 
3 .95 Win $3.00 . $2. 75 .50 Win $ 6.50 ·$2.75 
.05 Lose 2.00 .50 Lose 1.00 
4 .90 Win $2.00 $1.60 .50 Win $ 5.25 I $1. 88 .10 Lose 2.00 I .50 Le.se 1. 50 
5 .so Win $2.00 I $1.40 .• 20 Win $ 9.00 $1.40 I 
.20 Lose 1.00 • 80 Lose .50 
I 6 .80 Win $4.00 $3.10 .10 Win $40.00 $3.10 
I ! .20 Lose .so· .90 Lose 1.00 I I 
-
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Table 2 
Strength.of Preference Rating 
Given to Choices in Exp. I 
Bid more for: 
· P bet 
Mean: 3.06 
Chose P bet S. D.: : .93 
Mean: 2.78 
Chose$ bet S. D.: .94 
24 
$ bet 
Mean: 3.10 
S. D.: .91 
Mean: 2.78 
S. D.: .91 
·/:- . --···· 
" 
~'l •.. 
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Pair P bet 
·l 35/36 Win 
1/36 Lose 
2 34/36 Win. 
2/36 Lose 
3 34/36 Win 
2/36 Lose 
4 33/36 Win 
3/36 Lose 
5 29/36 Win 
7/36 Lose. 
6 32/36 Win 
4/36 Lose 
........ 
25 
'rable 3 
Bets Used in E~periment III 
Expected $ bet Expected 
·Value Value 
- . 
-· 
.. . 
400 ~86 11/36 Win 1600 385. 
100 25/36 'Lose 150 
250 233 14/36 Win 850 239 
50 22/36 Lose 150. 
300 272 18/36 Win 650 275 
200 18/36 Lose 100 
200 178 18/36 Win 500 175 
200 18/36 Lose 150 
200 142 7/36 Win 900 ·135 
100 29/36 Lose 50 
400 .350 4/36 Win 4000 356 
50 32/36 Lose 100 
. ...,..., 
., 
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Chose P bet 
Chose $ bet 
Exp. I 
.085 b .425 .510 a 
.031 C d .459 .490 
.116 • 884 1 
Table 4 
Proportions of Choosing 
and Bidding Responses 
Expected under the 
!']foll Model" 
Bid More For: 
P bet S bet 
pr'E' + E.'~ pr'~+ p'~' 
a b 
C d 
prs' + P'E.'~ prs + p'E_'~' 
Observed . 
Exp. II 
.261 
a b .271 .532 
.127 C d .341 .468 
.388 .612 · 
J 
1 
26 
l E:' + l?..'E.. 
1 
Exp. III 
.250 b .321 • 571 a 
.048 C d .381 .429 
• 298 .702 1 
.. 
.,;._( 
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Figure Captions 
Fig. 1. Summary of results for three experiments. 
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EXPERIMENT 
6 Bet Pair, 
173 Subjects 
Selling Method 
Imaginary Payoff 
,8 
.6 
... 
,2 
EXPERIMENT I I 
49 Bet Pair• 
66 Subjects 
Buying Method 
/moginory Payoff 
,8 
.6 
. .. 
.2 
EXPERIMENT I I I 
6 Bet Pair• 
14 Subjects 
Selling Method 
Real Payoff 
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a Given that the P-bet 
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was 
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